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Abstract
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-
Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
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1 Introduction
The Ordinal Shapley Value (OSV ) is a way to allocate gains realized by cooperation
in general economic environments. It is invariant with respect to the utility representa-
tion of the agents’ preferences and enjoys several desirable properties such as eﬃciency,
monotonicity, anonymity, and individual rationality (see Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
[2005]). It provides a reasonable outcome for a large class of environments even where
competitive equilibria or core allocations may fail to exist.
The OSV is a normative solution concept. An alternative approach to the problem of
sharing gains from cooperation consists of proposing mechanisms whose equilibria yield
“good” outcomes.1 In this paper, we propose the use of a bidding mechanism, which
combines and adapts to exchange economies proposals suggested in Pérez-Castrillo and
Wettstein [2001] and [2002]. Informally, the mechanism proceeds as follows: In stage 1
the agents bid to choose the proposer. Each agent bids by submitting an n-tuple of real
numbers, one number for each agent (including himself). The number submitted by agent
i for an agent j, is a commitment to forego a commodity bundle in case j is chosen as the
proposer. The bids submitted by an agent must sum up to zero. The agent for whom the
aggregate bid (sum of bids submitted for him by all agents including himself) is the highest
is chosen as the proposer. Before moving to stage 2, all the agents (including the proposer)
pay the “bid” (i.e., the promised commodity bundles) they submitted for the proposer. In
stage 2 the proposer oﬀers a feasible allocation of the total initial resources. The oﬀer is
accepted if all the other agents agree. In case of acceptance each agent receives the bundle
suggested for him in this allocation. In the case of rejection all the agents other than the
proposer play the same game again where the new initial endowments incorporate the
allocations paid and received by the end of stage 1.
We prove that the proposed bidding mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect equi-
librium the OSV correspondence for economies with at most three agents.
1See Moore and Repullo [1988] and Maniquet [2003] for papers dealing with implementation in general
environments. Winter [1994], Dasgupta and Chiu [1996] and Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños [2003] deal with
the implementation of the Shapley value in Transferable Utility games.
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2 The Ordinal Shapley Value and the Bidding Mech-
anism
We consider a pure exchange economy E consisting of a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of agents and
k ≥ 2 commodities. Agent i ∈ N is described by {ºi, wi}, where wi ∈ Rk is the vector of
initial endowments and ºi is a continuous and monotonic preference relation defined over
Rk.We denote by Âi and ∼i the strict preference and indiﬀerence relationships associated
with ºi, and e ≡ (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rk.
For this economy, Pérez-Castrillo andWettstein [2005] propose and prove the existence
of a solution concept, called the Ordinal Shapley Value (OSV ), the construction of which
relies on the notion of concessions. The use of concessions allows to “measure” the benefits
from cooperation. Concessions are made in terms of the reference bundle e.
Definition 1 The Ordinal Shapley Value is defined recursively.
(n = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent with preferences º1 and initial
endowments a1 ∈ Rk, the OSV is given by the initial endowment: OSV (º1, a1) = {a1} .
For n ≥ 2, suppose that the solution has been defined for any economy with (n− 1) or
less agents.
(n) In the case of an economy (ºi, ai)i∈N with a set N of n agents, the OSV ((ºi, ai)i∈N)
is the set of eﬃcient allocations (xi)i∈N for which there exists an n−tuple of concession
vectors (ci)i∈N , ci ∈ Rn−1 for all i ∈ N that satisfy:
n.1) for all j ∈ N, there exists y(j) ∈ OSV
¡
(ºi, ai + cjie)i∈N\j
¢
such that xi ∼i y(j)i
for all i ∈ N\j, and
n.2)
P
i∈N\j
cji =
P
i∈N\j
cij for all j ∈ N.
By definition, the OSV is eﬃcient. It is also consistent in the sense that any set of
(n − 1) agents is indiﬀerent between keeping their allocation or taking the concessions
made by the remaining agent and reapplying the solution concept to the (n− 1) economy
(property n.1). Moreover, to ensure fairness, the concessions balance out (property n.2).
In fact, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005] show that the concessions associated with
OSV allocations satisfy the stronger condition that they are symmetric, that is, the
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concession cij of agent i to agent j is equal to the concession c
j
i of agent j to i. Also, the
matrix of concessions associated with any OSV allocation is unique.
The bidding mechanism to implement the OSV is recursively defined as follows:
If there is only one agent {i}, he receives his initial endowments, so he obtains utility
ui(wi). (If only one player plays, there is no bidding stage.)
Given the rules of the mechanism for at most n − 1 agents, the mechanism for N =
{1, . . . , n} proceeds as follows:
t = 1: Each agent i ∈ N makes bids bij ∈ <, one for every j ∈ N, with
P
j∈N b
i
j = 0.
Hence, at this stage, a strategy for player i is a vector (bij)j∈N ∈ Hn, where Hn =n
z ∈ <n|Pj∈N zj = 0o.
For each i ∈ N , define the aggregate bid to player i by Bi =
P
j∈N b
j
i . Let α =
argmaxi(Bi) where an arbitrary tie-breaking rule is used in the case of a non-unique
maximizer. Once the proposer α has been chosen, every player i ∈ N pays biαe and
receives (Bα/n) · e.
t = 2: The proposer α oﬀers a feasible allocation (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rkn given the initial
resources (wi)i∈N .
t = 3: The agents other than α, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer. If an
agent rejects it, then the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise, the oﬀer is accepted.
If the oﬀer is accepted, each agent i receives xi. Therefore, the final payoﬀ to an agent
i is ui(xi). On the other hand, if the oﬀer is rejected, all players other than α proceed
to play the same game where the set of agents is N\{α} and the initial resources for
these players are (wi− (biα −Bα/n) e)i∈N\{α}; while player α is on his own with resources
wα − (bαα −Bα/n)e. The final payoﬀ to α is uα(wα − bααe+ (Bα/n)e). The final payoﬀ to
any agent i 6= α is the payoﬀ he obtains in the game played by N\{α}.
3 The implementation for economies with at most
three agents
We start by proving several properties of the OSV allocations for economies with two
agents.
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Lemma 1 (a) For a two-agent economy, both agents are indiﬀerent among the OSV
allocations.
(b) The concession c is the same for every OSV allocation and is a continuous function
of the initial endowments.
(c) Let x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i=1,2) and x0 ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi + λe)i=1,2), λ > 0. Then,
xi0 Âi xi for i = 1, 2.
Proof. (a) As shown in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004], the OSV for a two-
agent economy consists of the eﬃcient allocations (x1, x2) such that x1 ∼ w1 + ce and
x2 ∼ w2 + ce for some c ≥ 0. Consider now x, y ∈ OSV ((ºi, ai)i=1,2) and denote by
c = c12 = c
2
1 and d = d
1
2 = d
2
1 the concessions associated respectively with x and y. Then,
x1 ∼1 a1+ce, x2 ∼2 a2+ce, y1 ∼1 a1+de, and y2 ∼2 a2+de. It is immediate that x1 ≺1 y1
if and only if x2 ≺2 y2. The eﬃciency of both allocations x and y implies x1 ∼1 y1 and
x2 ∼2 y2.
(b) The previous argument also shows that c = d, while the continuity of preferences
implies that the concession varies continuously with the initial endowments.
(c) There exist c and c0 such that: x1 ∼ w1 + ce, x2 ∼ w2 + ce, x01 ∼ w1 + (λ + c0)e
x02 ∼ w2+(λ+ c0)e. The allocation x0 is Pareto eﬃcient in (ºi, wi+λe)i=1,2 whereas x is
feasible, yet not Pareto eﬃcient for the economy (ºi, wi + λe)i=1,2. Hence, it must be the
case that λ+ c0 > c and x0i Âi xi for i = 1, 2.
The next theorem shows that the set of Subgame Perfect equilibrium outcomes (SPE)
of the bidding mechanism coincides with theOSV for economies with at most three agents.
Theorem 1 The bidding mechanism implements the Ordinal Shapley Value in Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium in economies with n ≤ 3.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction.
(a) We first prove that every SPE outcome of the bidding mechanism is in the
OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) .
For n = 1 the proof is trivial. Note also that for economies with one agent, there is
only one OSV allocation.
Claim 1. In any SPE, any agent i diﬀerent than the proposer α accepts the proposal x
at t = 3 if xi Â yi for every i ∈ N\{α}, where y ∈ OSV ¡(ºj, wj − (bjα −Bα/n)e)j∈N\{α}¢ .
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Proof: First, by induction, in case of rejection the agents expect to obtain an allocation
in the OSV in the economy without the proposer (and where the concessions have been
added to or substracted from their initial endowment); second, by Lemma 1 (a), agents in
a two-agent economy are indiﬀerent among OSV allocations (as is the case for a one-agent
economy).
Claim 2. In any SPE of the game that starts at t = 2, the proposer α proposes
an allocation x that is Pareto eﬃcient and satisfies xi ∼ yi for every i ∈ N/{α}, where
y = OSV
¡
(ºj, wj − (bjα −Bα/n)e)j∈N\{α}
¢
. Moreover, every agent i ∈ N\{α} accepts
any oﬀer x such that xi % yi for every i ∈ N/{α}.
Proof: These are clearly equilibrium strategies for the agents other than the proposer.
As regards the proposer, he cannot gain by switching to another oﬀer that is accepted.
If he makes an unacceptable oﬀer he obtains the bundle wα − (bαα − Bα/n)e) which if
preferred to xα would violate the Pareto eﬃciency of the proposal x.
Claim 3. In any SPE, Bi = 0 for i ∈ N. Moreover, each agent is indiﬀerent about
the identity of the agent who is chosen as the proposer.
Proof: Denote by M the set of agents for whom the aggregate bid is the largest, that
is, M ≡ {i ∈ N |Bi = maxj∈N Bj}. We first claim that any agent j ∈ N is indiﬀerent
between any agent in M being chosen as the proposer. Indeed, if j would strictly prefer
some particular agent, say i ∈M to win, agent j would slightly increase his bid to agent
i and decrease his bid to the other agents in M so that agent i is chosen as the proposer
for sure. Following the change, by Lemma 1 (b), agent j would be better oﬀ.
If M = N, Claim 3 is proven. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that M 6= N and
denote by m (< n) the cardinality of M. Assume, for convenience, 1 ∈M. We now show
that agent 1 can achieve a better outcome by changing the bids he submitted in stage 1.
Consider the following change in the bids by agent 1: b101 = b
1
1 − , b10i = b1i − 2 for any
i ∈M\{1}, b10j = b1j +(2m−1) for a particular j /∈M, and b10j = b1j otherwise, with  > 0
and small enough. Then, B1 > B01 > B
0
i for all i 6= 1. In particular, 1 is chosen as the
proposer for sure. We claim that 1 is strictly better following this change in bids. To see
this, note first that bi1 did not change for any i 6= 1 and B01 < B1. Hence, in the economy
with agents N\{1}, after the change in the bids the “initial endowments” change from
(wj−(bj1−B1/n)e)j∈N\{1} to (wj−(bj1−B01/n)e)j∈N\{1}. Given B1 > B01, by Lemma 1 (c),
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all agents in N\{1} are worse oﬀ in the OSV of the second economy than in the OSV
of the former. Hence, at stage 2, agent 1 can oﬀer an allocation that is worse oﬀ for all
j ∈ N\{1} and, by Pareto eﬃciency, better oﬀ for himself. Therefore, agent 1 is better
oﬀ after bidding according to b10 than after bidding according to b1.
Claim 4. In any SPE, the oﬀer x made by the proposer at t = 2 always belongs to
OSV ((ºj, wj)j∈N) . Moreover, the agents’ bids at t = 1 are bij = cij for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
where c is the matrix of concessions of x, and bii = −
P
j∈N\{i} c
i
j.
To prove Claim 4, denote by x = x(i) ∈ OSV
¡
(ºj, wj − bjie)j∈N\{i}
¢
the proposal that
agent i ∈ N makes if he is chosen as the proposer (we notice that Claim 3 states that
Bi = 0). We are going to prove that x ∈ OSV ((ºj, wj)j∈N). First, according to Claim 2,
x is a Pareto eﬃcient allocation. Moreover, the n−tuple of vectors of bids (bi)i∈N satisfies:
i)ByClaim 3, xk ∼k x(j)k for j ∈ N, k 6= j, where x(j) ∈ OSV ¡(ºk, ak − bkj e)k∈N\{j}¢,
ii)
P
i∈N\{j}
bji =
P
i∈N\{j}
bij for all j ∈ N (by Claim 3, Bj = 0, i.e.,
P
i∈N\{j}
bij = −bjj;
moreover, the rules of the mechanism impose that
P
i∈N
bji = 0, i.e., −b
j
j =
P
i∈N\{j}
bji ).
Therefore, the allocation x is in the set OSV ((ºj, wj)j∈N) taking the matrix of con-
cessions cij = b
i
j for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
(b) We now prove every allocation x in the set OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) is an SPE outcome
of the bidding mechanism. We denote c the matrix of concessions of x. We propose the
following strategies for the case of n agents:
At t = 1, each agent i, i ∈ N, announces bij = cij for every j ∈ N\{i} and bii =
−
P
j∈N\{i} c
i
j.
At t = 2, agent i, if he is the proposer, proposes an allocation z that is Pareto eﬃcient
and satisfies that zj ∼ yj for every j ∈ N/{i},where y ∈ OSV ¡(ºj, wj − (bji −Bi/n)e)j∈N\{i}¢ .
(We recall that, according to Lemma 1 (a), in economies with one or two agents either
there is only one OSV allocation or agents are indiﬀerent among the several OSV allo-
cations.)
At t = 3, agent i, if agent j ∈ N/{i} is the proposer, accepts any oﬀer z such that
zi % yi, where y ∈ OSV
¡
(ºk, wk − (bkj −Bj/n)e)k∈N\{j}
¢
and rejects it otherwise.
First of all, we notice that if the agents make the previous bids, then the aggregate
bid to each one is zero. This is a direct consequence of the symmetry of the concessions.
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Second, if they make these bids, the proposal at t = 2 will certainly be x, given that
x is eﬃcient and guaranties the rest of the agents their OSV of the game without the
proposer and with the proposer’s concessions added to their initial endowment. Hence, if
the agents follow the previous strategies, the final outcome is always x.
We prove that the strategies are indeed SPE strategies. By the induction argument,
what the agents other than the proposer, say agent j, expect after the bids is some
allocation in OSV
¡
(ºk, wk − (bkj −Bj/n)e)k∈N\{j}
¢
. Therefore, it is easy to check that
the previous strategies are SPE strategies from t = 2 on. Consider now the strategies at
t = 1. Remember that we have shown that Bi = 0 for all i ∈ N. If agent i changes his
bid, the proposer will be the agent (or one of the set of agents) to whom i increases his
bid. Denote by α the proposer, and B0α > 0 the new aggregate bid. If α = i, then the
other agents will face a situation where all their initial endowments increase by the same
amount B0i/n. By Lemma 1 (c), all these agents are better oﬀ in the new situation, hence
agent i is worse oﬀ. If the new proposer is α 6= i, then the outside option for agent i will
be a situation where all the agents other than i and α will see their initial endowment
increased by B0α/n while agent i’s initial endowment will decrease by (n − 1)B0α/n. An
argument similar to that of Lemma 1 (c) shows that agent i’s situation is worse oﬀ after
the change. Therefore, deviating is not profitable.
The major diﬃculty with extending this result for any number of agents is intimately
related to the transfer paradox (Safra [1984]). We briefly explain here this diﬃculty.
It is crucial for our result that (as stated in Claim 3) the equilibrium aggregate bids
are zero for every agent. For this result, it must be the case that a proposer can not
gain by increasing the bid for himself and facing at the proposal stage agents with larger
endowments. However, similar to the transfer paradox, an agent can be worse oﬀ in an
OSV allocation when the initial endowments of all agents (including himself) increase. If
this happens, the proposer may find it “easier” (less costly in terms of his own welfare)
to make an acceptable proposal to the set of agents with larger endowments.
The mechanism constructed provides a non-cooperative foundation for the OSV for
environments with a small number of agents. It also shows that the concessions underlying
the OSV concept can be interpreted in terms of bids.
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